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Abstract
Environmental concerns linked to hog production are growing in the United States,
Canada and the European Union and therefore new regulations controlling animal manure
management are being imposed to address these concerns. This study determines that
potential increases in U.S. and Canadian environmental regulation would have minimal
eects on the relative competitiveness of their pork exports, while much more stringent EU
regulation has the potential to signicantly impact EU competitiveness and contribute to
continued increases in the market share of U.S. and Canadian pork exports.Introduction
World pork consumption has been increasing over the last decade and this change has led
to increases in the quantity of pork traded internationally. Total pork trade in 2000 is
projected to be approximately three million metric tons, which is a 43% increase over 1993
levels. Pork production in the United States has increased 9% in the last 10 years, and since
1995, the United States has taken on the role as a net exporter of pork to the world. Annual
U.S. and Canadian exports for 2000 and beyond are estimated to exceed 540,000 metric
tons, making these two countries the largest pork exporters and also establishing them
as a competitive threat to traditional European pork exporters (USDA-FAS, 2000). The
increases in U.S. and Canadian pork exports are due to recent improvements in the structure
of the U.S. industry and also to recent sanitary restrictions imposed on pork exports from
Taiwan (Foot and Mouth Disease) and the Netherlands (Classical Swine Fever) that have
opened foreign markets (USDA-ERS, 1996; Shaw, Shaer, Premakumar, and Hayes, 1997;
Hayes, 1997; USDA-FAS, 1998; Hayes, 1998).
The European Union, specically Denmark and the Netherlands, have had a continued
presence in the international market for pork. The competitiveness of U.S. pork exports
had traditionally been handicapped by problems associated with heterogeneous quality and
small-scale production and despite a history of relatively low feed and labor costs, U.S. pork
export quantities did not comprise a signicant share of total world pork trade. The recent
structural improvements in the U.S. hog and pork industries have facilitated the move to
larger operations using production technologies that yield the consistent quality of pork
that is demanded in the export market. Producers in the United States are now beneting
from the traditional low feed and labor costs as well as a new industry structure which has
allowed U.S. pork to become competitive in the international market.
The new organization of larger and more concentrated U.S. domestic production has
been accompanied by rising environmental concerns, which have in turn, driven increases in
the stringency of the environmental regulation facing animal feeding operations (Metcalfe,
2000b). This increase in the stringency of environmental regulation is not restricted to the
1United States alone as hog producers in Northern Europe and in Canada are also being
forced to comply with tougher domestic environmental regulation (European Commission,
1991; Blom, 1996; Gardner, 1996; Leuck and Haley, 1996; Ministry of Agriculture, 1999;
Srivastave and Bamford, 1999; Beghin and Metcalfe, 2000). In fact, binding constraints on
the amount of available agricultural land in the animal production regions of the European
Union and the resulting over-concentration of nutrients has forced EU policy makers to
propose and implement regulations that are more stringent than those being considered
in the United States and Canada. Increasing environmental regulatory stringency leads
to higher environmental compliance costs for hog producers. The increasingly strict EU
regulatory situation may cause compliance costs incurred in the European Union to dra-
matically exceed those in both the United States and Canada and seriously handicap EU
pork competitiveness in the world market.
This study examines the eects on competitiveness occurring from increases in the
stringency of environmental regulations that are being imposed on hog production in the
United States, Canada and the European Union. As the United States continues to expand
pork export quantities, what eect does increasing environmental regulation have on pork
processing costs and therefore on the competitiveness of pork exports? This study highlights
the environmental regulations facing the hog industry in the United States, Canada and
the European Union and also develops an equilibrium displacement model to examine the
consequences of increasing environmental compliance costs incurred by hog producers.
It is expected that increases in regulatory stringency will be greater in the European
Union than in the United States or Canada. Using this stylized fact, the empirical analysis
in this study shows that U.S. and Canadian exports increase at the expense of decreasing
EU exports. European Union export losses are greatest in the important Japanese market
where U.S. and Canadian exports are expected to increase from 1% to 9% depending on the
eventual relative dierences in compliance costs. This possible loss in competitiveness pro-
vides an incentive for EU processors to call for harmonization of environmental regulations
across countries.
2The next section of the paper provides background on competitiveness in the interna-
tional pork market and also discusses the stringency of environmental regulations imposed
in the United States, Canada and the European Union. The equilibrium displacement
model is then developed and the results are discussed explaining the potential eects on
exports resulting from potential increases in environmental regulation.
Competitiveness and Environmental Regulation
The concept of competitiveness is an elusive one. There are many denitions of a `com-
petitive' industry based on various measures such as: costs, productivity, trade patterns,
market share, and protability. Competitiveness in this study will be based on the widely
accepted denition proposed by the Canadian Task Force on Competitiveness: Competi-
tiveness is the sustained ability to protably gain and maintain market share (Agriculture
Canada, 1991). Figure 1 shows the market shares of the major pork exporting regions for
the years 1993 through 2000. The obvious decrease in the competitiveness of Taiwanese
exports (due to sanitary restrictions) and the continued presence of the European Union,
the United States and Canada in the international pork market can be seen.
Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, and the United Kingdom are
the major EU pork exporting countries, with Denmark alone accounting for 41% of total
EU exports in 1999 (USDA-FAS, 2000). Denmark and the Netherlands export the majority
of pork outside the EU community and these producers are very competitive in the interna-
tional pork market because they produce a high quality product, that meets nal consumer
preferences in several export markets, and they have also historically beneted from large
government support for exports under the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Leuck,
Haley, Liapis, and McDonald, 1995). The EU hog and pork industries are also very coor-
dinated and benet from the increased eciency provided by this coordination. Even so,
producers in the European Union incur feed, labor, and facility costs greater than those
faced by producers in the United States and Canada (Brewer, Kliebenstein, and Hayenga,
1998). These higher production costs combined with increasing EU environmental regula-
3tion, CAP reforms reducing the protection aorded EU producers, and currently imposed
sanitary restrictions, all provide opportunities for the U.S. and Canadian industries to ex-
pand their export market share.
Export quantities for those markets important to the United States, Canada and the
European Union are provided in Table 1. Japan is the largest pork import market in the
world and in 1998, the United States, Canada, and the European Union supplied 68% of
total Japanese imports, at the expense of banned Taiwanese exports. In 1996, before Tai-
wanese sanitary trade restrictions were imposed, Taiwan supplied 40% of Japanese imports
and the United States, Canada and the European Union supplied only 39% (USDA-FAS,
1997, 1999a).
The analysis performed in this study concentrates exclusively on the changes in competi-
tiveness resulting from changes in environmental compliance cost. Environmental legislation
regulating animal feeding operations in the United States varies considerably across indi-
vidual states and this regulation has been evolving rapidly over the last 10 years. The
United States benets from a low population density and an abundance of agricultural
land and therefore is not facing the carrying capacity constraints that countries such as the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark are currently experiencing.
Animal feeding operations in the United States are regulated primarily at the state level
through restrictions and requirements imposed on manure management systems and eld
application techniques. The stringency of this regulation varies from state to state but most
states regulate some aspect of manure system construction and manure eld application
(Metcalfe, 2000b). It has been estimated that waste management costs in the U.S vary
from $0.40 to $3.20 per hog, which is 1% to 8% of total hog production costs (Blauser,
Forster, and Schnitkey, 1990; Zering, 1996; Fleming and Babcock, 1998; NPPC, 1999)
Environmental regulation in Canada is similar to the United States in that stringency
varies across provinces. Most Canadian provinces set some type of standards to protect
ground and surface water by controlling storage and eld application of manure, but the
costs associated with complying dier with the stringency of regulation. Low population
4density and greater land availability in rural areas are characteristics of Canada, and the
United States, that lead to lower expected increases in compliance costs compared to the
expected future increases in the European Union (Hacker and Du, 1993).
The 1991 European Community Nitrate Directive, the central legislation regulating
European water quality, prescribes minimum water quality standards limiting nitrate from
all potential sources. Most hog producing regions in Northern Europe do not currently
satisfy the maximum acceptable nitrate concentrations that were set in this directive and
it is believed that implementation of more drastic environmental policies will progressively
bring these regions into compliance while simultaneously increasing costs for hog and pork
production and limiting the competitiveness of EU exports (Leuck and Haley, 1996).
Denmark exports the largest percentage of EU pork and has extensive regulations impos-
ing many engineering requirements and setback restrictions as well as nutrient eld applica-
tion standards (Danish Advisory Centre, 1993). Environmental regulation also discourages
production on large hog operations by linking the size of operation and the required amount
of land ownership necessary for manure disposal. The Danish EPA estimates the eective
compliance cost is within the range of $1.20 to $1.50 per hog on a 1800 hog operation. The
cost component induced by regulation of land ownership imposed additional costs of ap-
proximately $14 per hog for large operations (Danish EPA, 1995).1 The Danish government
must continue to implement more stringent policies in order to reduce nitrate emissions by
100,000 tons per year, which represents about half of total agricultural emissions (Fortin
and Salaun, 1995; Sommer, 1996; Oce of Agricultural Aairs, 1998).
Animal production areas in the Netherlands currently violate 1991 European Commu-
nity Nitrate Directive standards and, as in Denmark, compliance will require restricting
applications of nitrogen on land to rates lower than are currently allowed. Dutch opera-
tions are regulated by phosphate quotas, regulations on waste treatment, restrictions on
storage and eld application, and more recently, direct output controls. The compliance
costs of phosphate quotas, manure storage regulations, and eld application restrictions
are estimated as costing approximately $4.05 per hog. The necessary future reductions in
5nitrogen emissions could impose costs on Dutch producers of up to $27.88 per hog. There-
fore, it is likely that future regulation will compromise the competitiveness of the livestock
industries in the Netherlands (Ministry of Agriculture, 1995; Derrick, Hendriks, and ten
Have, 1996; Burton, 1997; Den Ouden, 1997; Vukina and Wossink, 1998).
Looking at regulation and compliance costs in the United States, Canada and the Eu-
ropean Union demonstrates the relatively stringent and more costly restrictions that may
be imposed on EU producers. The international competitiveness of U.S. and Canadian
pork has been increasing given recent technological and operational changes and it is hy-
pothesized that relatively lower environmental compliance costs are an additional source
of comparative advantage for U.S. producers. The next section develops an equilibrium
displacement model to examine this possibility.
Model
The equilibrium displacement model developed here is similar to the methodology used
in past studies and consists of a series of log linear dierential equations which represent
supply, demand, and market clearing relationships in the U.S., Canadian and EU hog and
pork industries (Muth, 1964; Sumner and Wohlgenant, 1985; Alston, 1986; Beghin, Brown,
and Zaini, 1997). The eect on pork processors' costs are presumably small relative to
overall pork processing costs and therefore the model is established in log linear form as the
convenience aorded by this approximation is not outweighed by the loss of accuracy.
Variables considered as endogenous to the model are the proportional changes in the
prices and quantities of pork processed and the proportional changes in the prices and
quantities of the live hogs used as inputs in pork processing. Changes in environmental
compliance costs are represented as exogenous `shifts' in the marginal cost curves for live
hog producers and the corresponding eects on the marginal costs of pork processors are
then calculated. These changes in pork processing marginal costs are used to obtain changes
in prices and examine changes in the market shares of pork exports. The model examines
the competitiveness of exports in the top ve U.S. pork export markets which are listed in
6Table 1.
The model is rst developed for U.S. pork processors and hog producers. Domestic
demand for U.S. pork is a function of the price of U.S. pork and also of the prices of the
Canadian and EU pork that is imported into the United States.2 Therefore, the proportional









The operator E(x) = dx=x = dlnx is used to represent proportional changes. The notation
used to distinguish prices and quantities is, Pi
j, where i is the location where the pork is
processed and j is the location where it is consumed. That is, EPeu
us, is the price paid in the
United States for pork that is processed in the European Union. The cross-price elasticities
capture the substitution eect that occurs when the price of pork changes and the notation
used is, !
i;j
k , where this represents the eect on the quantity of pork processed by region j
which is consumed in market k when there is a change in the price of pork produced in i.
For example the value, !eu;can
us , would be the percentage change in the quantity of Canadian
pork consumed in the United States resulting from a one percent change in the price of EU
pork.
Foreign demand for U.S. pork exports is a function of U.S. pork export price and the
prices of competing Canadian and EU exports. Canada and the European Union are com-
petitors in the pork markets of Japan, Russia, and Hong Kong. The European Union does
not export a signicant amount of pork to either Canada or Mexico and therefore only the
prices of U.S. and Canadian pork are considered in these markets (FAO, 1999).
The level of U.S. pork export prices are inuenced by both transportation costs and
trade policy. The transportation costs that are incurred moving pork are not insignicant,
but for this study it is assumed that changes in environmental regulation do not signicantly
inuence these costs and they are therefore excluded from the model.
Trade policy is an important factor inuencing the price consumers pay for interna-
7tionally traded pork. A two-tiered tari rate quota (TRQ) policy is utilized in Japan and
Mexico and the eects associated with trade policy in these two countries are examined




i + ti (2)
where Pus
i is the price consumers in market i pay for pork processed in the United States, ti
is the per unit tari in market i and market i is one of the import markets examined: Japan,
Canada, Mexico, Russia, or Hong Kong.3 Equation (2) leads to the following relationship






i are the ratio of the price received by U.S. processors to the price paid by
consumers in market i, where consumer price is the processor price plus the tari value.
This ratio will be calculated for each of the TRQ rates in Japan and Mexico and the eect
of changes in these rates on the model results will be examined.
Given these trade policy eects, proportional changes in the demand for U.S. pork within
each foreign market is a function of foreign consumer prices for U.S. pork and the prices of














Total export demand for U.S. pork is equal to the sum of pork exported to all ve export
markets and therefore the following relationship holds for proportional changes in the total



















TE is total U.S. exports and us
i is the proportion of U.S. pork exported to market
8i.
Equation (5) shows that proportional changes in total U.S. exports are negatively related
to the price of U.S. exports. This is expected because increasing marginal costs for U.S.
processors increases the price of U.S. exports which in turn leads to a reduction in total
U.S. export demand (a loss of competitiveness). Changes in competitors' pork prices are
positively related to U.S. export quantity since increases in EU and Canadian environmental
compliance costs leads to increases in EU and Canadian pork prices and therefore to an
increase in the quantity of U.S. exports (a gain in competitiveness).
Total demand for U.S. processed pork is equal to the sum of demand in the domestic
market and in all export markets. In terms of proportional changes, this implies
EQus
T = usEQus
us + (1   us)EQus
TE (6)
where us is the proportion of U.S. production that is consumed domestically.
Studies on the pork products industry suggests that producers exert market power
which results in a mark-up of output price over marginal cost (Shroeter and Azzam, 1991;
Morrison, 1997). Assuming demand elasticity in all markets remains constant for small
changes in price, then in terms of proportional changes of prices and marginal costs in the
model, it is true that
EPi
j = E(MCi); (7)
where MCi is the marginal cost of pork processors in i.4 Utilizing this relationship and
inserting equations (1) and (5) into equation (6), provides the following equation represent-
ing proportional changes in the quantity of U.S. pork demand as a function of the marginal






























i ] > 0.
The supply of U.S. pork is based on the marginal cost of U.S. pork processors. Exogenous
increases in the environmental compliance costs incurred by U.S. hog producers will lead
to increases in the price of hogs and therefore to increases in the marginal cost of U.S.
pork processing. Proportional changes in the marginal costs of U.S. pork processors are a









where us represents the second partial derivative of the cost function with respect to
quantity and hog input price5, us
p is the proportion of hog price in marginal cost, EPus
h is
the price of hogs in the United States, and us
p is the elasticity of U.S. pork supply.
A representation for the derived demand for hogs is obtained through dierentiation of
the total cost function for pork processors with respect to the hog input price and therefore
proportional changes in the quantity of hogs demanded by U.S. hog producers are assumed







h is the quantity of U.S. hogs demanded, us
h is the demand elasticity of U.S.
hogs, and the product of usus is the scale elasticity of live hog inputs used in U.S. pork
processing.
The supply of hogs is derived from the marginal cost of hog production and is therefore
inuenced by the amount of environmental compliance costs incurred by hog producers.
Changes in the environmental regulations imposed on U.S. hog producers leads to changes
in the cost of hog production as producers incur additional manure management costs.
These additional costs are referred to as the increase in U.S. environmental compliance
costs. Marginal hog cost is obtained from the total cost function and then proportional










where Rus is U.S. compliance cost, us
R is the proportion of environmental compliance costs
in total hog production cost and us
h is the supply elasticity of hog production. Assuming
equilibrium in the hog market, equating equations (10) and (11), and then substituting for
EPus
h in equation (9) provides the proportional change in the total quantity of U.S. pork
processed in terms of changes in U.S. pork processing marginal cost and U.S. environmental
compliance cost.
EQus
T =  us[(us
h + us









h ) > 0. Equating pork demand with pork
supply, equation (8) and (12), closes the model and yields the relationship of proportional
changes in the marginal costs of U.S. pork processors with the changes in U.S. environmental






















where Nus =  usus
h usus
p us
r > 0 and 
us =  us(us
h + us
h ) + us
us > 0. Equation (13)
shows that increases in the U.S. environmental compliance costs imposed on hog producers
leads to increases in the marginal cost of U.S. pork processors. It also captures an indirect
eect such that the increasing marginal costs of EU and Canadian pork processors leads to
increasing marginal costs for U.S. processors. This indirect eect on U.S. pork processors'
marginal costs is due to increases in U.S. pork output resulting from increases in U.S.
output.6
Analogous relationships for the marginal costs of EU and Canadian pork processors are
also calculated in a manner similar to equations (1) through (13) above. These equations,
as well as their derivations, are provided in the appendix in order to simplify presentation.
11Using equation (13) as well as the appendix equations (24) and (34), provides the following
three equations directly relating changes in the marginal costs of pork processors to the
changes in environmental regulatory costs in the three production regions.
E(MCus) = A1ERus + A2EReu + A3ERcan;
E(MCeu) = A4ERus + A5EReu + A6ERcan; (14)
E(MCcan) = A7ERus + A8EReu + A9ERcan;
where the values for all Ai are calculated using the parameters in the model7. The rela-
tionships in equation (15) are used to calculate changes in marginal costs and then these
changes are used in equations (5), (17), and (27) to obtain changes in total U.S., EU and
Canadian exports respectively.
Most of the necessary parameter estimates are collected from past analyses of the pork
and hog industries, while the remaining parameters that could not be found in past studies,
are calculated in Metcalfe (2000a). All of the parameters values are provided in Table 2.
Results
Exogenous changes in this model occur because of increases in the environmental compliance
costs facing U.S., EU, and Canadian hog producers. Examination of waste management
cost studies suggests that these increases can be expected to range up to 200% in the United
States and Canada and may reach upwards of 500% in the more stringently regulated Eu-
ropean Union (Blauser, Forster, and Schnitkey, 1990; Wossink, 1994; van Hofreither, 1995;
Zering, 1996; Lauwers, 1998; Martens, 1998; Fleming and Babcock, 1998). Therefore, to
reect realistic possible scenarios, results are presented with U.S. and Canadian compliance
costs increasing 0%, 100% and 200% while European Union compliance costs increase 100%,
300% and 500%.
The results for changes in U.S., EU, and Canadian export quantities are provided in
Tables 3, 4 and 5 respectively. Overall, it can be seen that U.S. exports increase in all of
12the scenarios examined. This increase in U.S. exports comes at the expense of decreasing
EU exports resulting from the inevitable increases in compliance costs that will occur in EU
pork processing. Canadian pork exports increase in most all scenarios expect those where
Canadian compliance costs increase more than U.S. costs. The magnitudes of these changes
are signicant when increases in compliance costs are asymmetric across countries. That
is, when one production region experiences relatively greater increases in compliance costs,
there is a corresponding decrease in that region's export quantity.
It should be noted that given the short run aspect of the model, there are no EU pork
exports to Canada and Mexico and therefore there is no competition for U.S. exports in
these markets. So, even as U.S. prices increase, there is little loss in U.S. export quantities
to these markets. It would have to be expected that given U.S. price increases, over some
time period there would be entry of EU pork exports into the Canadian market to oset
this result.
Gains in total U.S. export quantities range from 0.5%, when U.S. compliance cost in-
creases are high relative to EU and Canadian increases, to a gain of 12.6% when U.S.
increases are low compared to those in the European Union and Canada. The largest gains
are in the important Japanese market where U.S. exports climb approximately 1% when
U.S. compliance costs are relatively high to 9% when U.S. cost increases are relatively low.
The largest percentage increases occur in the Russian and Hong Kong markets. These
increases reach upwards of 40% when EU compliance costs are high.
Losses in total EU exports range from about 4% to 24%. Large losses for EU exports
are expected since compliance cost increases in the European Union will be much greater
than those in the United States and Canada. The largest percentage losses for EU exports
occur in Russia, the United States, and Japan. Gains for Canadian pork export quantities
are more modest than the gains experienced by the United States. These increases reach a
maximum of 6.5% when Canadian compliance cost increases are relatively low. The largest
increases occur in the markets of Russia, Hong Kong, and Japan.
Sensitivity analysis is performed on the model to examine the eect of the following
13parameters which are either unknown or have multiple values and therefore eects are
examined over a range: the price elasticity of U.S. domestic pork demand (us
us), price
elasticity of derived demand for hogs (i
h), the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to
pork quantity (i
p), trade policy eects in the Japanese and Mexican markets (i
1, i
3), and
the cost share of U.S. compliance cost (i
r). All sensitivity results show that the model is
robust when these parameters are altered over estimated ranges.
Conclusion
Environmental regulations controlling the manure management aspects of hog production
are becoming more stringent in the United States, Canada and the European Union. This
increasing regulatory stringency results in increases in the compliance costs incurred by hog
producers and these increases in hog production costs are passed on to the pork processing
sector. The increases in U.S. and Canadian pork export quantities over the last ve years
have been a result of the increasing competitiveness of these industries in world markets
and the results of this study suggest that relatively lower compliance costs could provide
an additional source of competitiveness for these industries.
Export quantities of U.S. pork were 530,000 metric tons in 1999, which is an increase of
364% since 1990, and export value exceeded $1 billion, a 214% increase over this same time
period. Exports to the Japanese market in particular quadrupled in volume and free trade
agreements continue to open this and other markets to U.S. pork exports. Given these
increases, exports now account for over 6% of total U.S. pork production and are impor-
tant to the economic health of the industry (USDA-FAS, 1999b). Although environmental
regulation is expected to increase in the United States, this does not signicantly aect
the competitiveness of U.S. exports and in fact, the relatively more stringent regulations
that may be imposed in the European Union actually help to increase the competitiveness
of U.S. pork. Canadian exports also experience an increase given relatively more strin-
gent European Union regulations. The most dramatic eects occur for EU pork processors
who experience large decreases in export quantities and this result suggests benets to EU
processors from a move towards harmonized environmental regulations.
14Endnotes
1 This value is calculated without accounting for the revenue generated through cultivation
of the land and therefore this gure is an upper bound on the cost of the land requirement
on large hog farms.
2 It is assumed that the prices of other livestock that act as pork substitutes are not sig-
nicantly aected by changes in hog production costs and because this model is interested
in examining only those factors that respond to a change in the stringency of environmen-
tal regulation faced by hog producers, prices of these substitutes are not included in the
domestic demand function.
3 Note that the value for t varies for Japan and Mexico depending on current TRQ tari
rates.
4 Derivation of equation (7) in Metcalfe (2000a)
5 Imposing the mathematical condition that the order of dierentiation is inconsequential
and using Shepard's lemma, reveals that this value is also the change in hog demand with
respect to the change in processed pork quantity. This restriction is imposed in equation
(10).
6 This model is looking at the short run and does not allow for expansion of the industry.
Therefore, increases in quantity must be produced using existing capacity which leads to
increasing marginal cost.
7 Presentation of the mathematical expressions of all Ai variables is not enlightening and is
therefore excluded from the paper. These expressions are available from the author.
15Table 1: U.S. and EU Pork Exports - 1998
U.S. EU Canada
(metric tons)
Japan 167,458 172,114 53,402
Hong Kong 17,439 99,432 6,500
China 7,746 44,137 *
S. Korea 5,069 45,695 2,569
Russia 37,657 307,484 9,434
E. Europe * 169,755 11,286
Canada 32,298 * -
Mexico 43,824 * 10,611
U.S. - 77,800 214,241
Total 557,000 1,002,000 432,000
* Exports are minimal
Source: USDA-FAS






































































17Table 2: Parameter Values
Parameter i=us i=eu i=can Parameter i=us i=eu i=can
b b b b
i i i i b 0.935 0.941 0.735 h h h h
i i i i
i
efi 1.00 0.77 1.00
l l l l
i i i i h 1.39 1.39 1.39 h h h h
i i i i
1
d 1.10 1.10 1.10
x x x x
i i i i bh 0.722 0.756 0.673 h h h h
i i i i
2
d 0.21 0.21 0.21
f f f f
i i i i
us
a 1 1 1 h h h h
i i i i
3
d 6.28 6.28 6.28
f f f f
i i i i
1 1 1 1
a 0.456 0.456 0.456 h h h h
i i i i
4
d 1.78 1.78 1.78
f f f f
i i i i
2
a 1 1 1 h h h h
i i i i
5
d 0.46 0.46 0.46
f f f f
i i i i
3
a 0.833 - 0.833 h h h h
i i i i
us
ef 1.00 1.00 1.00
f f f f
i i i i
4
a 1 1 1 g g g g
i i i i
us us us us
bh - 0.118 0.757
f f f f
i i i i
5
a 1 1 1 g g g g
i i i i
1 1 1 1
bh 0.576 0.262 0.196
e e e e
i i i i
h
g 0.628 0.628 0.628 g g g g
i i i i
2 2 2 2
bh 0.148 - -
e e e e
i i i i
p
k 3 3 3 g g g g
i i i i
3 3 3 3
bh 0.105 - 0.030
h h h h
i i i i
h
k 0.75 0.75 0.75 g g g g
i i i i
4 4 4 4
bh 0.101 0.468 0.003
a a a a
i i i i
r
a 0.045 0.190 0.045 g g g g
i i i i
5 5 5 5
bh 0.068 0.151 0.015
a a a a
i i i i
h
cj 0.700 0.622 0.700
Sources: 
a calculated in this study, 
b USDA-FAS Statistics, 
c Lawrence, Schroeter, and Hayenga (1998), 
d FAPRI (1999)
e Skold, Grundmeier, and Johnson (1989), 
f Moschini and Melike (1989), 
g Holt and Johnson (1988), 
h NPPC (1999a)
i Shaw et.al (1997),
 j DECANETHUS (1999), 
k range used
18Table 3: Changes in U.S. Export Quantities
EU Cost Canadian Cost Increase
Increase 0% 100% 200%
0% Increase in U.S. Compliance Costs
100% 2.3% 2.7% 3.1%
(8,082) (8,985) (9,888)
300% 1.9% 7.5% 7.8%
(24,247) (25,150) (26,053)
500% 3.3% 12.2% 12.6%
(40,412) (41,315) (42,218)
100% Increase in U.S. Compliance Costs
100% 1.4% 1.8% 2.1%
(4,000) (4,903) (5,806)
300% 6.1% 6.5% 6.8%
(20,164) (21,068) (21,971)
500% 10.9% 11.3% 11.6%
(36,329) (37,232) (38,135)
200% Increase in U.S. Compliance Costs
100% 0.5% 0.8% 1.2%
(82) (820) (1,723)
300% 5.2% 5.6% 5.9%
(16,082) (16,985) (17,888)
500% 10.0% 10.4% 10.7%
(32,247) (33,150) (34,053)
Change in metric tons in parenthesis
19Table 4: Changes in EU Export Quantities
EU Cost Canadian Cost Increase
Increase 0% 100% 200%
0% Increase in U.S. Compliance Costs
100% -4.7% -4.6% -4.5%
(-53,947) (-53,237) (-52,526)
300% -14.3% -14.2% -14.1%
(-161,843) (-161,132) (-160,422)
500% -23.8 -23.7% -23.6%
(-269,739) (-269,028) (-268,317)
100% Increase in U.S. Compliance Costs
100% -4.3% -4.2% -4.1%
(-49,884) (-49,173) (-48,462)
300% -13.8% -13.7% -13.6%
(-157,780) (-157,069) (-156,358)
500% -23.3% -23.2% -23.1%
(-265,675) (-264,964) (-264,254)
200% Increase in U.S. Compliance Costs
100% -3.7% -3.7% -3.6%
(-45,820) (-45,110) (-44,399)
300% -13.3% -13.2% -13.1%
(-153,716) (-153,005) (-152,295)
500% -22.8% -22.7% -22.6%
(-261,612) (-260,901) (-260,190)
Change in metric tons in parenthesis
20Table 5: Changes in Canadian Export Quantities
EU Cost Canadian Cost Increase
Increase 0% 100% 200%
0% Increase in U.S. Compliance Costs
100% 0.6% -0.2% -1.1%
(2,341) (-873) (-4,089)
300% 1.9% 1.0 0.2%
(7,024) (3,809) (593)
500% 3.3% 2.4 1.5%
(11,707) (8,491) (5,276)
100% Increase in U.S. Compliance Costs
100% 2.2% 1.3% 0.4%
(7,831) (4,616) (1,401)
300% 3.5% 2.6% 1.7%
(12,514) (9,299) (6,084)
500% 4.8% 3.9% 3.0%
(17,197) (13,982) (10,767)
200% Increase in U.S. Compliance Costs
100% 3.7% 2.8% 1.9%
(13,322) (10,106) (6,891)
300% 5.1% 4.2% 3.3%
(18,004) (14,789) (11,574)
500% 6.4% 5.5% 4.6%
(22,687) (19,472) (16,257)
Change in metric tons in parenthesis
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